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Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic internal fraud model for operational losses in
retail banking. It considers public operational losses arising from internal fraud in
retail banking within a group of international banks. Additionally, the model takes
into account internal factors such as the ethical quality of workers and the risk con-
trols set by bank managers. The model is validated by measuring the impact of
macroeconomic indicators such as GDP growth and the corruption perception upon
the severity and frequency of losses implied by the model. In general,results show
that internal fraud losses are pro-cyclical, and that country specific corruption per-
ceptions positively affects internal fraud losses. Namely, when a country is perceived
to be more corrupt, retail banking in that country will feature more severe internal
fraud losses.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies operational losses due to internal fraud in the retail segment of banks.
Internal fraud is defined as operational losses due to acts that involve at least one internal
party aimed at defrauding, misappropriating property, or circumventing regulations, the law, or
company policies (BCBS 2006). As Kochan (2013) suggests, internal fraud is one of the fastest-
growing and most complex criminal threats to financial organizations. This type of threat from
insiders takes various forms because fraud can occur at any level of the administrative ladder,
from junior employees up to chief executives. Internal fraud events are due to factors such as
worker compensation, culture, or macroeconomic conditions (Jarrow 2008)
Retail banking is a traditional, universal type of banking involving payment services (debit
cards), short-term unsecured loans (credit cards), money management facilities (current ac-
counts), savings, loans, and mortgages. According to ORX (2012), retail banking experiences
the larger number of operational loss events, 59% for the period 2006-2010, and increasing to
65% in 2011. In addition, the gross losses in retail banking are the most severe of losses across
business lines, representing up to 37% of total losses by business line.
The nexus between internal fraud and retail banking has not been explored much in the
literature. Given the importance of the retail segment in the banking business, it is important
to shed some light in the topic by laying out a dynamic model of loss generation in the internal
fraud - retail banking cell. The model is set to mimic the aggregate behaviour of these losses
in the ORX database.1 In addition, other specific information about banks that participate in
the ORX consortium is obtained from different outlets such as financial service authorities and
their corporate Web pages. The model is validated by measuring how observed macroeconomic
variables outside the model affect the loss severities and frequencies. The paper finds that there
is a strong association between macro variables and fraud losses in retail banking.
The model can be used as an operational risk management tool. Scenario analysis and
operational risk capital simulations are straightforward to perform. For example, the model
can be used to evaluate different data aggregation techniques in dealing with consortium data.
1The Operational Riskdata eXchange Association (ORX) is a global data sharing association whose members
comprise the biggest banks in the world.
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To the best of our knowledge, the operational risk management literature has not provided
a quantitative model for describing internal fraud in the financial sector; this study is the first
to contribute in this direction. The internal fraud model borrows insights from a number of dis-
ciplines such as corporate governance, behavioral economics, human resources, and operational
risk.
Related literature
In the operational risk literature, there is a group of papers that build on quantitative models
that explain the outbreak of operational loss events. Ku¨hn and Neu (2003) studies models that
generate operational losses in banks through network dynamics that lead to the occurrence of
risk events in an environment where banks make efforts to mitigate operational losses. Leippold
and Vanini (2005) uses functional dependence modeling to extend the work of Ku¨hn and Neu
(2003, 2004) by including fixed and stochastic costs that arise in case of operational risk events.
Based on this strand of the literature, Bardoscia and Bellotti (2011) models the amount of
operational losses recorded at a certain time in a certain process.
Our paper differs from the above studies in the scope of loss generation. Our model focuses
on internal fraud in retail banking whereas the aforementioned studies are more general and
thus take into account the network structure of operational losses.
Other papers like Fragnie`re et al. (2010), Hatzakis et al. (2010) or Weiss and Winkelmann
(2011) introduce the quality and quantity of the workforce as a source of risk. The importance
of human capital in the operational loss process of financial institutions accords with the idea
that the key process of a bank is the handling of information. Banking is known to be a
knowledge-intensive business process (Weiss and Winkelmann 2011). This calls for a modeling
approach that takes the quantity and quality of employees into account.
Our paper shares the insights of the managerial approach in Fragnie`re et al. (2010); however,
this latter study is focused on the planning of workforce capacity and do not touch on factors
that generate operational losses due to internal fraud.
Our paper is also related to the literature that studies how macroeconomic and macro
institutional factors affect operational losses such as Allen and Bali (2007), Chernobai et al.
(2011), Moosa (2011), Cope et al. (2012), Li and Moosa (2015), Stewart (2016), Abdymomunov
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et al. (2017) and Wagner et al. (2017). Some of these papers stress the relationship between
macroeconomic activity and operational losses. For instance, Allen and Bali (2007) and Wagner
et al. (2017) provide evidence that loss severities are pro-cyclical. The evidence is not conclusive.
Abdymomunov et al. (2017) finds evidence for greater aggregate losses in a downturn and Moosa
(2011) finds that severity is positively associated with the unemployment rate. On the other
hand, Li and Moosa (2015) finds that loss severities are positively related to the size of the
economy.
The above evidence takes operational losses in general. Closest to our paper is Stewart
(2016) which provides evidence that bank fraud and economic activity are positively related.
Also, Cope et al. (2012) finds that internal fraud losses are strongly and positively associated
with the countries’ legal frameworks that favor insider trading and are negatively associated
with country-specific constraints on executive power in banks. Last, Chernobai et al. (2011)
finds that the frequency of internal fraud losses in financial institutions depend positively on
features such as market value, fast liability growth and financial distress while negatively related
to default-risk and the age of firms.
Our paper also studies the relationship between macroeconomic variables and operational
losses but different from the above papers, it does not use observed operational loss data but
simulated internal fraud losses that mimic the ORX data. The association between those macro
variables and operational losses serves to validate the model and provides first evidence pointing
to a positive link between the corruption culture in a country and internal fraud in retail banking.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows, section 2 lays out the dynamic model for
internal fraud losses, section 3 describes the publicly available data used in the paper, section
4 focuses on the calibration and regression results and section 5 concludes.
2 A model for internal fraud events
We setup a dynamic model for operational loss occurrence due to internal fraud in the retail
segment of banks. The model calibration aims to mimic the first moments of aggregate severity
and frequency of operational losses drawn from ORX database reports. The model takes into
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account the specific factors that trigger internal fraud losses in each of the banks that took part
of the ORX consortium during the period 2006-2010.
2.1 Setup
The stochastic model aims to explain operational losses due to internal or insider fraud in the
retail-banking context within each financial institution in terms of a set of conditioning factors.
The main equation in the model is given by
li,τ = αi,0 × ramp (αi,1 + αi,cci,τ + αi,yyi,τ + αi,qqi,τ + ξi,τ ) (1)
where li,τ stands for an internal fraud loss in retail banking at bank i at moment τ . The
Greek letter subscript τ denotes moments of time during a given year t. In practice, it can
represent days or hours within a year. The variable ci,τ is the investment or effort made by
bank i to avoid the operational loss, or it can measure the level of internal controls. This variable
can be measured as the share of monetary resources devoted to risk management and control and
can be expressed as a percentage of operating costs. Higher standards of internal risk controls
(ci,τ high) imply that the likelihood of operational loss events is reduced. Internal fraud events
are somewhat more controllable than losses originating from external sources (Chernobai et al.
2011). This control aspect of operational losses is outlined, for example, in Kochan (2013).
The amount yi,τ represents the scale of production in the business line; for retail banking,
it can represent the number of transactions with bank clients, or it can represent retail income.
A higher number of transactions imply that the likelihood of operational losses increases. In
the theory of people risk management, this scale level yi,τ is a proxy for internal and external
interactions, which give rise to operational losses due to fraud (Blacker and McConnell 2015):
The bigger the scale of the business, the higher the number of interactions. In an environment
of increased employee interaction, fraud risks rise.
Variable qi,τ measures the ethical quality of employees. High internal ethical standards mean
that losses due to internal fraud are less likely to occur. The ethical quality of workers is different
from the technical quality of workers, which is measured directly by worker productivity (e.g.,
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gross income per worker). Therefore, the quantity and quality of human capital proposed by
Fragnie`re et al. (2010) are key determinants of operational losses in retail banking.
From the variables explained so far, the volume of gross income yi,τ is directly observable.
Information about these variables can be gathered from the annual reports of each of the banks
in the ORX dataset. On the other hand, the level of controls ci,τ and the quality of employees
qi,τ are not directly observable. Specific feedback equations are required to model both variables
to elicit their unobserved values and see how they quantitatively affect the generation of losses
through Eq. (1).
The last variable left to be explained in Eq. (1) is ξi,τ . This variable represents unknown
factors or shocks that can potentially trigger losses. This random variable is assumed to be
autocorrelated and heteroskedastic. The idea that loss shocks are autocorrelated and may
exhibit volatility clustering is similar to what Chernobai and Yildirim (2008) and Gue´gan and
Hassani (2013) suggested. In particular
ξi,τ = ρiξi,τ−1 + σi,τµi,τ , µi,τ ∼ N(0, 1), σ2i,τ = β0,i + β1ξ2i,τ + β2σ2i,τ−1 (2)
The coefficient ρi ∈ [0, 1] measures the level of autocorrelation or the persistent nature of
shocks that may trigger losses. The error term σi,τµi,τ is heteroskedastic by virtue of the time-
varying nature of the variance term. The variance term σ2i,τ , also known as conditional variance,
depends on past shock realizations as well as past variance itself.2
Eq. (1) also calls the function ramp(.), which represents the mapping from operational loss
factors to loss severities. This function has the feature of generating zero losses most of the
time and positive loss severities at other times.3. Formally, the ramp function is defined by
ramp(x) =

x if x ≥ 0
0 of x < 0
2The way conditional variance behaves is called generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity
(GARCH), as proposed in Bollerslev (1986).
3Ku¨hn and Neu (2004) and Bardoscia and Bellotti (2011) used the same type of function.
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To finish the description of Eq. (1), all the coefficients (αi,0, αi,1, αi,c, αi,y, αi,q) vary across
banks, but they are constant through time. This reflects the fact that operational loss oc-
currences are sensitive to each of the factors described, which are idiosyncratic for each bank.
The levels of operational risk control (ci,τ ), and the quality of the workforce (qi,τ ) need to be
modeled.
The level of operational risk controls (ci,τ ) obey a feedback equation whereby the controls or
efforts by risk managers to prevent or mitigate operational losses depend on the observable state
of the system. Control is a fundamental aspect of risk management, the actual ISO standard
defines risk management as “coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with
regard to risk” (ISO 2009).
In this study, the levels of controls are represented by a sufficient statistic denoted by ci,τ .
The learning or improved control process depends on the level of risk. This idea is common
in stochastic control environments and follows the example of Cooke and Rohleder (2005) who
proposed a very general feedback model of operational risk. Our paper incorporates this idea
and is explicit about the level of risk that feeds back onto the control level. The feedback control
equation can be expressed as
ci,τ =
ρc(2c
∗
i )
1 + exp
(
γi(
L̂i,τ−1
Ŷi,τ−1
− λi)
) + (1− ρc)ci,τ−1 (3)
where c∗i stands for the optimal level of controls associated with a benchmark loss ratio λi when
the actual loss ratio is given by
L̂i,t
Ŷi,t
. The control level at bank i depends on the observed
key risk performance given by the ratio of cumulative average observed losses over cumulative
income. If the observed loss ratio is beyond the desired level, with γi < 0, control levels need to
be adjusted upward. The degree of the actual adjustment depends on the parameter ρc ∈ [0, 1].
The higher ρc, the quicker the control response is. In the opposite case, when ρc is small, the
control level is mostly governed by its previous value.
In Eq. (3), L̂i,τ−1 stands for the cumulative average observed losses up to the previous
time, while Ŷi,τ−1 corresponds to cumulative gross retail income obtained in the same period.
Capital letters stand for average quantities, while the circumflex denotes that the variable is the
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observable counterpart of an unobservable underlying variable. In the case of operational losses,
this distinction is important. An observed loss amount in a bank i at time τ is l̂i,τ whereas the
true loss is li,τ . Eq. (3) means that banks, which experience a history of large losses relative to
other banks, will learn from the incidents and therefore increase their controls to levels above
average. This idea is also suggested in Lukic et al. (2013).
On the other hand, the quality of the workforce (qi,τ ), which refers to ethical traits that
drive workers’ behavior toward the bank is a measure of the propensity to commit fraud. For
example, an employee can be extremely knowledgeable of internal processes at the bank and
so be highly productive, but good knowledge of internal processes may make it easy to commit
fraud (Cummings et al. 2012). The equation that describes the ethical quality of workers is
qi,τ =
2Q¯ρq
1 + exp
(
δi(ai,τ − A¯τ )(ei,τ − E¯τ )
) + (1− ρq)qi,τ−1 (4)
where ai,τ stands for measured technical quality (labor productivity), A¯τ is the cross-bank
average labor productivity, ei,τ is the number of employees per branch at bank i, and E¯τ is the
cross-bank average of employees per branch. Given that δi > 0, the sign of the impact effect of
an increase in technical quality is given by
∂qi,τ
∂ai,τ
=

< 0 if ei,τ > E¯τ
≥ if ei,τ ≤ E¯τ
When there are few workers, increasing productivity is more likely associated with high
ethical quality because it is easier for banks to screen workers before and after recruitment.
When the number of workers is high, the workforce screening process is weaker. Due to the
symmetry of Eq. (4), it is also true that
∂qi,τ
∂ei,τ
=

< 0 if ai,τ > A¯τ
≥ if ai,τ ≤ A¯τ
which means that an increase in the number of workers harms the ethical quality of workers
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when the average technical productivity of workers is already high.
Eq. (4) incorporates, in an explicit way, two concepts in the theory of people risk manage-
ment. First, the basic fraud model based on the Cressey’s fraud triangle (see Cressey 1953)
asserts that fraud has three elements: Motivation or pressure to commit fraud, the opportunity
to commit fraud, and the rationalization or justification that a fraudster makes to him or herself
to commit fraud. An employee, often in dire financial straits, using its insider information about
the firm’s control system, redirects funds to other sources.
The insider information about the control environment is possible if the employee possesses
knowledge about many processes in the bank. In this study, this knowledge is approximated by
the technical productivity of workers in firm i at time τ : ai,τ
The second key fraud theory concept embedded in Eq. (4) refers to interactions in the firm.
In the words of Blacker and McConnell (2015): “Inappropriate interactions between individuals
inside and outside of the firm give rise to People Risk” (p. 121). Blacker and McConnell
underscore the qualitative nature of employee interactions. In this study, it is argued that the
qualitative level of interactions (inappropriate or bad) increases with the quantitative number
of interactions that should be proportional to the number of employees scaled per branch ei,t
at bank i during period t.
Therefore, Eq. (4) shows that the ethical quality of employees (inverse of the propensity
to commit fraud) falls when both opportunities for fraud and the number of inappropriate
interaction rise as suggested by the theory of people risk.
After losses {li,τ} for the set of banks i = {1, . . . , N} at high frequencies τ = {1, . . . , T} are
generated by the stochastic dynamic system given by Eqs. (1) to (4), the loss data have to be
recorded and submitted to the pooled database.
Of note is that data recorded to build the loss datasets are not the same as the original loss
data {li,τ} for a number of reasons. For example, the existence of recording thresholds indicates
that only losses greater than a threshold level lmini are submitted to the dataset. Moreover, when
a loss event occurs, banks do not necessarily know the exact loss amount incurred. There is a
natural lag between occurrence of an event that involves loss and knowledge of the severity of
the event. The lag depends on the specific nature of the event. For the purposes of this research,
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it is assumed that the severity of the event is known at the same time as its occurrence but that
the knowledge is imperfect and subject to measurement errors. Therefore, the observed dataset
process implies
lˆi,τ = li,τ + ηi,τ (5)
where lˆi,τ is the observed loss severity, li,τ is the true unobserved loss severity (underlying loss)
and ηi,τ is an unbiased, white noise measurement error distributed normally ηi,τ ∼ N(0, σ2ηi).
The measurement errors are independent over time and across banks, but heterogeneity across
banks is allowed. The losses submitted to the pooled dataset and used for internal purposes are
described by
Di = {lˆi,τ |lˆi,τ > lmini } for τ = 1, · · · , T (6)
In the data collection process, both σ2ηi and l
min
i are assumed to be exogenous. In fact, the
value of lmini determined for all member banks of the ORX association is e20,000.
2.2 Model calibration
The parameters that specify the stochastic dynamic operational loss model described above
are not free. It is necessary to restrict the parameters to specific values. Standard estimation
techniques such as linear regression cannot be conducted because there is no hard data and the
model exhibits unobservable variables like control and quality of workers. This implies that the
model parameters need to be calibrated. The operational loss simulation process is conditional
on the value of these parameters.
Some parameters are specific to banks (idiosyncratic), so they have the subscript i in their
notation. Other parameters are common to all banks. The procedure for calibration of all
parameters, general and specific, is described below. There are 13 idiosyncratic parameters
per bank (see Table 1). Given that there are up to 52 banks, it would be necessary to pin-
down about 672 idiosyncratic parameters in total. Given the vast number of parameters to
be calibrated, a very simple shrinkage procedure is introduced to reduce the number of pa-
rameters to be calibrated based on the available information, the period of analysis, and the
specific banks under study. In essence, the shrinkage procedure used in this study takes into
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Table 1. Parameters of the Dynamic Model for Operational Losses
Param. Equation Definition
αi,0 Internal fraud losses Overall scale of losses
αi,0 Internal fraud losses Constant within ramp function
αi,c Internal fraud losses Impact of controls on losses
αi,y Internal fraud losses Impact of gross operating income on losses
αi,q Internal fraud losses Impact of quality of workers on losses
ρi Internal fraud losses Autocorrelation of operational loss shocks
β0,i Internal fraud losses Constant in conditional variance of operational loss shocks
β1 Internal fraud losses Influence of past shocks on conditional variance of operational
loss shocks
β2 Internal fraud losses Influence of past variance on conditional variance of operational
loss shocks
ρc Loss control Weight of new conditions to affect current controls
c∗i Loss control Control level associated to desired operational loss ratio
γi Loss control Controls de sensitivity of control to the loss ratio gap from
the desired ratio
λi Loss control Desired loss ratio
ρq Ethical quality Weight of new conditions to affect current ethical quality levels
δi Ethical quality Determines the sign of impacts from factors
Q¯ Ethical quality Level of average ethical quality across banks
A¯ Ethical quality Average labor productivity across banks
E¯ Ethical quality Average number of employees by branch across banks
σ2ηi Measurement error Variance of measurement errors
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Table 2. Observable Variables that Condition the Simulation of Losses in Each Bank
Nomenclature Description Type
ei,t Number of employees Idiosyncratic
bi,t Number of branches and offices Idiosyncratic
ai,t Retail assets (millions of Euros) Idiosyncratic
yi,t Retail loans (millions of Euros) Idiosyncratic
mi,t Proxy for operational risk management awareness Idiosyncratic
hi,t Proxy for human resource awareness Idiosyncratic
account the idiosyncratic data collected for each bank. These data proxy the degree of riskiness
and heterogeneity of each bank and are used to map the heterogeneous values of the model
parameters.
The starting point for model calibration is the operational loss summary report presented
in the ORX database (ORX 2012) for the period 2006-2010. In this report, there are 4, 357
internal fraud loss events recorded in the retail-banking segment; the gross amount of losses
reached e880 million.
Table A-1 in Appendix A shows the banks that reported losses to the ORX data exchange
during the period 2006-2010. New members entered the association, and some members quit
due to bankruptcies, mergers, or acquisitions. For example, Wachovia was a member of the
association until acquired by Wells Fargo in 2008.
For each of the N banks and years under analysis, a set of variables categorized as key
risk indicators are gathered. These variables condition the occurrence of losses in the model or
serve as useful devices to calibrate idiosyncratic parameters. The set of conditioning variables is
described in Table 2. All the variables indicate risk exposure such as the number of employees
or the size of retail loans. These variables are useful devices to apply the shrinkage procedure
because they discriminate among banks. For example, according to Cressey’s fraud triangle
explained before, banks that have higher employees per branch relative to the mean among
banks might be deemed riskier than those that have lower employees per branch. Therefore,
the dispersion of employees per branch across banks is useful to calibrate parameters across
banks.
In contrast to the model specification in the preceding subsection, the observed variables
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are indexed by time (t), where t stands for end-of year variables. Idiosyncratic variables for
the years 2006 through 2010 were obtained from annual reports that member banks published
on their Web sites.4 The values of interest were extracted from the descriptive information,
balance sheets, and income statements contained in the aforementioned reports. These reports
are publicly available as part of the information disclosure by banks directed to investors. The
financial statements in these reports are compatible with sound regulatory and accounting
practices and, on the majority of cases, they accord to GAAP.
An example of the information recovered from these annual reports is given in Fig. (1). The
figure shows that the size of banks in the ORX dataset is heterogeneous. Each dot refers to
a specific bank. The number of employees ranges from 10 to about 140 thousands, while the
number of branches varies from 300 to about 10,000. In addition, both the number of employees
and number of branches show some degree of correlation.
Figure 1. Number of branches and employees for banks in the ORX dataset
Note: Information extracted from bank’s annual reports as of December 2006
4In the few cases when reports were not available, we got information from SEC filings.
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In addition to the objective information included in the annual reports, proxy variables
related to operational risk controls and the quality of human resources at each bank were
constructed. Thus, variable mi,t measures operational risk management awareness implicit in
the information shared with the public. This awareness proxy was obtained by means of textual
analysis of the published annual reports; for example, the number of times a word or a phrase
occurred within each report divided by the number of pages. An example of this type of textual
information is given by Fig. (2), which depicts the ratio of word counts of the expression
“operational risk” as a percentage of the total number of pages. This variable could arguably
reflect the extent of awareness of each bank toward operational risk management.5
Figure 2. Word counts of the expression “operational risk” as percentage of page counts in
each 2010 annual report.
Note: Information extracted from bank’s annual reports as of December 2010
Other textual expressions that reflect operational risk awareness are analyzed, for example,
the use of the acronym AMA.
The variable hi,t is intended to measure the awareness of banks about human resources.
The annual reports also contain information about policies geared to improve the management
5The idea of extracting information from textual sources is not new in finance (Kearney and Liu 2014).
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and quality of human resources. So, human resource awareness could be obtained from textual
analysis by extracting word counts of expressions such as “employees” or “human resources”.
The assumption is that these indicators reflect the quality of the workforce and are related
inversely to the occurrence of internal fraud.
All the extracted information from banks’ disclosures reflects the state of banks at calendar
year-ends. Therefore, in order for these variables to be entered into the simulation model, it is
necessary to perform simple linear interpolations to complete data for all moments of time τ
between any consecutive years t and t+ 1. It is assumed that time τ will refer to business days
within years. The existence of holidays was excluded in these calculations.
Five parameters affect the outbreak of operational losses in Eq. (1). All these parameters
are idiosyncratic; therefore, it was necessary to devise a way to calibrate all of them in a simple
form. Let αi,j be a parameter in Eq. (1) for i = {1, · · · , N}, and j = {0, 1, c, y, q}. Then for each
j, there exists a mean parameter value taken from the cross section of banks. α¯j =
∑N
i=1 αi,j .
By pinning down the value of α¯j , it is possible to pin down the idiosyncratic parameters of
interest αi,j .
To complete the process, it is necessary to work with risk exposure indicators calculated
from the data shown in Table 2. Let these indicators be defined by xi,t, for example, the ratio
of employees per branch or the technical quality of workers (labor productivity) measured as
the ratio of total retail loans to the number of employees. These measures can be calculated for
each financial institution and for each calendar year in the sample. Fig. (3) depicts a histogram
of the number of employees per branch at the end of 2006 in all banks belonging to the dataset
by the end of that year.
Next, let x¯ = 1NT
∑T
t=1
∑N
i=1 xi,t be the overall average risk indicator and x¯i =
1
T
∑T
t=1 xi,t
be the bank i average. If there are grounds to postulate direct proportionality between the
coefficient αi,j and the indicator x¯i, then each parameter can be pinned down according to
αi,j =
( x¯i
x¯
)
α¯j for i = 1, · · · , N (7)
For example, for parameters αi,0, αi,1, and αi,y, the choice of xi,t =
ei,t
bi,t
is a reasonable
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Figure 3. Histogram of the number of employees per branch across banks in the ORX
database as of December 2006.
Note: Information extracted from bank’s annual reports as of December 2006
option. This means that loss event sensitivities are correlated with the ratio of employees to
banks. In this case, only the parameter α¯j need be calibrated. Once its value is determined,
Eq. (7) fixes the distribution of αi,j parameters across banks.
The parameters αi,c and αi,q are likely to be inversely proportional to the ratio xi,t =
ei,t
bi,t
.
For example, controls are more effective when there are fewer people working at branches.
The adjustment can be made according to
αj,i =
( x¯
x¯i
)
α¯j for i = 1, · · · , N (8)
Parameters ρi and β0,i can be adjusted in the same fashion. In the case of the autocorrelation
of shocks ρi, it is necessary to set bounds ρmin > 0 and ρmax < 1, such that the resulting
operation ρ′i =
x¯i
x¯ ρ can be further modified to become bounded within the range [ρmin, ρmax].
To do so, it is first necessary to calculate ρ′min and ρ
′
max with the parameters obtained given ρ
and then to apply
ρi = ρmin +
(
ρmax − ρmin
ρ′max − ρ′min
)
(ρ′i − ρ′min) for i = 1, · · · , N (9)
The parameter β0,i controls for the unconditional variance of operational loss shocks in each
bank, as shown in Eq. (2). The dispersion of this parameter across banks can also apply the
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principle underlying Eq. (7).
Three idiosyncratic parameters affect the level of controls (c∗i , λi, γi). The first parameter
measures the long-run value of control levels. Current control levels may be stricter or easier
than this long-run benchmark, which also needs to be on the range [0, 1]. To calibrate the
dispersion of this parameter, the indicator mi,t that measures operational risk management
awareness can be used in the same fashion as the calibration of the dispersion of parameter ρi.
Parameter λi reflects the operational loss level as a ratio of operating income that banks
are ready to accept. Operational loss ratios larger than this benchmark λi prompt banks to
increase their controls. Calibration of this parameter for each bank is problematic because the
available information does not provide reasonable proxies for this ratio. Therefore, this paper
assumes that this ratio is similar across all banks. Its level is determined by the median 2008
ratio of cumulative operational losses to gross operating income provided by Benyon (2008).
Parameter γi is a feedback adjusting parameter. From Eq. (3), it is easy to note that for
controls to tighten whenever the operational loss ratio increases, the parameter γi has to be
negative. The greater γi is in absolute value, the greater the impact on control levels. Again,
it is reasonable to assume that the absolute value of γi is directly proportional to the level of
operational risk awareness mi,t and thus, the calibration of the dispersion in γi will apply the
same steps outlined above.
In terms of the ethical quality of human resources in a bank, the parameter δi measures
how sensitive each bank’s workforce quality is to the bank’s size and labor productivity. Eq.
(4) assumes that size and labor productivity may be detrimental to workers ethical quality.
Therefore, parameter δi is positive, and the higher it is, the more sensitive ethical quality
becomes. The sensitivity may be related inversely to the human resource awareness proxy hi,t
extracted from the data. Human resource awareness is related to how important is the workforce
in terms of well-being, compensations, and on-the-job training, for example.
The last idiosyncratic parameter calibration that needs a shrinkage procedure is the variance
σ2ηi of the measurement error in recording the severity of operational losses. It is reasonable to
assume that higher severity levels are associated with higher measurement error variances. To
reflect this feature, the study used the aggregate operational loss figures reported in Benyon
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(2008). The losses reported by Benyon refer to the aggregate of all types of operational losses,
not just retail banking. A summary of this data is depicted in Fig. (4), which shows the
existence of an extreme asymmetry of operational loss severities; in fact, two important modes
appear for losses less than e10 million and for losses larger than e100 million. It is assumed
that banks facing large loss severities are likely to have large variances in their measurement
errors when they record operational losses. Therefore, the dispersion in σ2ηi will be calibrated
by the dispersion of loss severities documented in Benyon (2008).
Figure 4. Histogram of aggregate 12-month cumulative operational losses for October 2008 in
banks in the ORX database.
Note: For each bank, average percentages are reported. Ranges of losses are expressed in millions of Euros. The
continuous line is the histogram; the dashed line is a polynomial smoothing of the original histogram. Data
were obtained from Benyon (2008)
After the shrinkage procedure is executed, the space of parameters to calibrate shrinks to
20. The mean value α¯j of the parameters in the operational loss (Eq. 1) was calibrated to
generate loss severities compatible with the 2012 summary of the database for retail-banking
losses due to internal fraud (ORX 2012). The mean value of the parameter β¯0 was set to
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pin down the frequency of losses documented in the ORX summary. Parameters ρ¯, β1 and
β2 determined the clustering pattern of operational loss shocks. According to (Chernobai and
Yildirim 2008), internal fraud losses exhibit low clustering as opposed to other type of losses.
Hence, the calibration assigns relatively low values to these parameters in the range 0.01 and
0.1.
Two parameters measure speed of response. First, ρc measures how quickly internal con-
trols are implemented to achieve a new level after new conditions arise and are expected to
persist. Second ρq measures how fast the average ethical workforce achieves a new level when
conditioning factors change and are expected to last.
Regarding ρc, in broad terms, control levels do not change from one day to another, and
some changes necessary to implement control adjustments may require budgeting, planning,
and extra human resources. In a given year, the average worst scenario would be to wait half a
year to implement full changes. Thus, if the number of business days in a year is about 260 and
the number of working days to implement a new long-run control level is 130, approximately
65 days are necessary for implementing half the changes. Due to the auto-correlated nature of
controls in Eq. (3) and a half-life of τ ′ = 65 days, the parameter ρc is then set to the value
ρc = 1 − (12)1/τ
′ ≈ 0, 011. Changes in the average level of ethical quality of the workforce
may take even more time, and therefore, the parameter ρq would have to be lower than the
benchmark of 0,011.
Two parameters need to be determined in the control equation (Eq. 3), namely the mean
value of long run control levels c¯∗ and the mean sensitivity of control to loss ratio γ¯. In the
ethical quality equation (Eq. 4), there are four parameters to be set; two of them being the
average labor productivity A¯ across banks and the average number of employees per branch
across banks E¯ , which are both readily estimable from the data.
All the remaining parameters grouped in the vector (c¯∗, γ¯, δ¯, Q¯, σ¯2η) are set freely with the
hope that given their benchmark values, the simulated loss severities and frequencies are asso-
ciated with external observed factors such as macroeconomic and institutional variables.
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Table 3. Data Gathered from Public Sources about Banks in the ORX Exchange
Key Concept Measure
No Number of bank Index
bname Bank name Index
country Bank headquarters’ country Index
code Country and Bank Code Index
year Year Index
ccy Report’s Currency Code Text
branches Number of branches and offices (Retail) Count
staff Number of staff (total) Count
staff r Number of staff (Retail) Count
loans Total loans to customers Currency millions
loans r Total loans to customers in retail banking Currency millions
assets Consolidated assets Currency millions
assets r Assets in retail banking Currency millions
tier1 Tier 1 capital Percent
nic Net interest income (total) Currency millions
nic r Net interest income (retail) Currency millions
3 The data
Most but not all the data necessary to perform the analysis belongs to the ORX data exchange.
However, this dataset is proprietary. Instead, the data gathered for the analysis in this paper
relies entirely on public information. All banks publish their annual reports and financial
statements each year and sometimes more often. These reports do not contain information
about operational losses but contain most of the idiosyncratic data needed for model calibration.
Table 3 summarizes the type of data collected from each of the reports or financial statements.
Fig. (5) provides a brief description of the dataset. The figure shows pairs of scatterplots
between the numbers of branches, the number of staff related to retail banking operations, the
level of retail loans, and the value of retail assets. All currency amounts were converted to
millions of Euros. Data comprised five years for all 52 banks considered.
All variables considered in Fig. (5) are indicators of the scale of operations in the retail
banking segments of each bank. This explains the remarkable positive correlation between 0.62
and 0.82. These scale indicators belong to the set of risk indicators that likely induce the
20
Figure 5. Scatter plot of bank data per year.
appearance and severity of internal fraud losses.
The calibration procedure needs more specific risk indicators. Hence, the analysis relies on
other forms of risk indicators that could be collected from annual reports. Textual content is
useful to calibrate sensitivity parameters as shown in Section (2). Table (4) shows the textual
context variables extracted from the annual reports. The variables refer to the number of
instances a descriptive key word or phrase appears within the entire texts; also, the total
number of report pages is recorded in order to calculate the ratio of instances to number of
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pages. These ratios give an indication about the relative importance of a key word that banks
use in their public reports.
Table 4. Variables Contained in the Textual Database
Key Concept
nbank Number of bank in database
bname Bank name
country Country of bank headquarters
code Bank Code = country code.bank
year Year
orisk “Operational risk” term frequency in annual reports
risk “Risk” term frequency in annual reports
rman “Risk management” term frequency in annual report
ama “AMA” (Advanced Measurement Approach) term frequency in annual reports
hres “Human resource” term frequency in annual reports
emp “employee” term frequency in annual reports
Col “colleague” term frequency in annual reports
workers Sum of “employee” and “colleague” term frequencies
npag Number of pages in the Annual Report
Both panels in Fig. (6) show scatter plots of textual variables. Panel A contains variables
related to human resource management. It shows scatterplots of “human resource” paired with
the sum of “employee” and “colleague” instances in annual report texts as a proportion of total
number of pages in each report. Panel B contains variables related to risk management. It
shows the paired scatter plot of the triplet of risk, risk management, and AMA instances as a
proportion to total pages. All plots show positive correlations.
In terms of global variables that affect all banks or groups of banks, the analysis incorporates
variables such as GDP growth rates in the countries to which banks belong. The dataset also
contains a number of variables that could affect the outbreak of losses due to internal fraud
such as the rule of law in a country or its corruption perception index.
Fig. (7) shows the corruption perception index (CPI) for each of the relevant countries
during the years of analysis. In the data, Brazil and Italy are shown to have higher corruption
perceptions while countries like Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, and Canada are seen to be less
likely to be corrupt. The perception of corruption is possibly associated with real corruption
levels, and the extent of corruption can affect the occurrence of fraud internal or external to
banks because they are related to the cultural environment that rationalizes frauds according
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Figure 6. Scatter plot of textual context variables.
Panel A Panel B
Table 5. Variables Contained in the Macroeconomic Database
Key Indicator name
country name Country Name
country code Country Code
Year Year 2006-2010
gdp growth GDP growth (annual %)
crisis Financial crisis dummy variable for 2007 and 2008
gover effective Government Effectiveness
reg quality Regulatory Quality
rule law Rule of Law
cont corrup Control of Corruption
cpi Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score (2006-2010)
to Cressey’s triangle.
A good measure of the fitness of the operational risk model to generate internal fraud
losses is whether those losses are associated to the macro-risk indicators in the same fashion
as documented in empirical research as shown for example in Chernobai et al. (2011), Moosa
(2011), Cope et al. (2012), Abdymomunov et al. (2017), and Stewart (2016).
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Figure 7. Corruption perception index (CPI) for countries where banks have their main
headquarters.
Note: The lower the index, the more a country is perceived to be corrupt. The data were based on figures
released by Transparency International.
4 Results
First, we report the results of the calibration procedure. Second, conditional on calibrated
parameters, model simulations that capture the loss profile are performed, given the environment
and conditions that banks faced during the period 2006-2010 (See Table A-1). Third, with the
simulated data for each bank and their corresponding conditioning factors, regression results
that show the link between macro variables and operational losses are presented.
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4.1 Calibration results
Table 6 shows the value of the general parameters that set the behavior of the equations in
the operational loss model. The setting of these parameters applied the calibration procedure
outlined in Section 2. The target of the calibration is to allow the model to simulate aggregate
losses as close to reality as is possible. The only reality check available was to mimic the mean
frequency and severity of losses due to internal fraud in the retail segment across the banks
belonging to the ORX data exchange for the period 2006-2010. Therefore, the calibration
procedure uses an optimizing framework to pin down the mean parameters of the loss equation
described in Table 6.
Table 6. Calibration of Parameters
Definition Value Eq.
α¯0 Mean scale parameter 0.400 Loss outbreaks
α¯1 Mean constant within ramp function 16.810 Loss outbreaks
α¯c Mean impact of controls -275.291 Loss outbreaks
α¯y Mean impact of gross operating income -1.587 Loss outbreaks
α¯q Mean impact of quality of workers on losses 0.052 Loss outbreaks
ρ¯ Mean autocorrelation of loss shocks 0.70 Loss shocks
ρmin Lower threshold for loss shocks autocorrelation 0.50 Loss shocks
ρmax Upper threshold for loss shocks autocorrelation 0.90 Loss shocks
β¯0 Mean constant term 0.20 Shock variance
β1 Influence of past quadratic shocks 0.01 Shock variance
β2 Influence of past variance 0.70 Shock variance
ρc Weight of new conditions to affect controls 0.10 Loss control
c¯∗ Mean long run value of control level 0.5 Loss control
c¯min Lower threshold for long run control level 0.3 Loss control
c¯max Upper threshold for long run control level 0.7 Loss control
γ¯ Sensitivity of controls to the losses -0.5 Loss control
λ Desired loss ratio 0.0003 Loss control
ρq Sensitivity to recent ethical quality 0.05 Ethical quality
δ¯ Determines the sign of impacts from factors 0.2 Ethical quality
Q¯ Level of average ethical quality across banks 0.7 Ethical quality
σ¯2η Variance of measurement errors 0.012 Measurement error
lmini Threshold level for operational loss reporting 20 Reporting
Note: The shrinkage procedure uses the parameters denoted with overbars. An optimizing search proce-
dure determines the α parameters.
The optimizing framework hinges on minimizing the quadratic distance between the observed
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mean loss severity and the simulated mean loss severity. In addition, the optimization puts
weight on the fact that almost all banks in the dataset must face losses. In reality, a bank with
no operational losses in the pace of five years is rare. The parameters that affect banks in an
idiosyncratic way are determined by the shrinkage procedure described in Subsection 2.2. Figs.
(B-1) and (B-2) in the appendix depict the distribution of these parameters across banks. The
idiosyncratic parameters calibrated through this procedure therefore serve as a useful device to
control for the heterogeneity observed in the banks in the ORX sample.
4.2 Simulation results and analysis
This study simulates 500 alternative histories of operational losses for the years 2006-2010 within
the banks in the ORX database by drawing from the shocks in Eq. (1). The simulations consider
the specific conditions banks confronted during the five-year period in terms of their own risk
exposure and controls implemented. After each simulation, the gross amount of operational
losses as well as the number of losses across banks were calculated. The 500 data points are
drawn in Fig. (8), where the straight lines mark the actual values reported in ORX (2012).
Each point in Fig. (8) summarizes a possible five-year history of data aggregated across
each of the 52 banks. Each bank has 500 possible histories of operational losses conditional to
the circumstances in effect during those five years.
As a model validation step, this paper studies the association between simulated operational
losses and covariates based on each bank and covariates that reflect the macroeconomic envi-
ronment. Given the heterogeneity of operational loss data, this paper models the loss frequency
distribution and the loss severity density in such a way that the location and scale parameters
of these functions are affected by the set of covariates.
The paper uses the generalized additive models for location, scale, and shape (GAMLSS)
as developed in Stasinopoulos et al. (2007) and used by Ganegoda and Evans (2013) in the
operational risk context. Let the simulated data be given by counts of loss outbreaks {nˆi,T } for
each bank i and during years T and sequences of loss severities (valued in Euros) {lˆi,τ} during
the period under analysis. Severity observations and yearly count (frequencies) can be modeled
using standard statistical distributions used in the operational risk literature.
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Figure 8. Summary of simulations and comparison to ORX report.
The GAMLSS approach implies that covariates affect the location and scale parameters of
these distributions. If the severities are lˆi,τ , the GAMLSS method assumes that they are drawn
from a density function f(lˆi,τ ; Θi) conditional on Θi. In this paper, the conditioning parameter
vector is given by Θi = (µ˜i, σ˜i)
′, where µ˜i stands for location and σ˜i stands for scale. Both
parameters are linked to covariates through link functions
g1(µ˜i) = Z1ω1
and
g1(σ˜i) = Z2ω2
where Z1 and Z2 are covariates that affect the distributional parameters and the ω
′s are the
corresponding sensitiveness coefficients.
The regressions comprise the mean and the scale parameters using a number of distributional
assumptions and specifications about the behavior of the mean or the scale of the distributions
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as functions of the covariates. In contrast to simple OLS regressions6, the GAMLSS method
tackles the heteroscedastic nature of the data in a straightforward way.
Severity regressions
Table 7 shows the results for the best performing model for loss severities in retail banking
associated with internal fraud. This model is the truncated Weibull with mean and scale
parameter.7.
Results show that when a country to which a bank belongs to grows, the average size of
losses increases. This result is similar to findings reported in Povel et al. (2007) and Stewart
(2016). This positive impact has to do with the opportunistic behavior of workers stressed by
Blacker and McConnell (2015). Arguably, in general macroeconomic boom periods more fraud
opportunities arise.
In addition, when a country is perceived as more corrupt (lower CPI), the average losses are
higher. In the model section, our paper points out that the level of bad interactions inside and
outside banks bring about a rationalization for fraud. The corruption perception of a country is
a proxy for outside bad interactions. In this sense, if criminal or corrupted behavior of citizens
is broadly accepted in a society, then workers find more rationale for stealing from banks.
The regressions also consider idiosyncratic variables. For example, higher levels of opera-
tional risk controls reduce loss severities, higher employees per branch increase loss severities
and higher assets per employee reduce loss severities. These three effects are expected because
they are embedded in the loss model calibration or specification.
Nevertheless, the remarkable finding is that neither the GDP growth nor the CPI were used
to calibrate the loss model or as causal variables in the model specification, yet they significantly
cause fraud losses. Furthermore, this finding conforms well with existing theory of how internal
fraud losses occur.
Table 7 also shows the results for the scale parameter of the truncated Weibull distribution.
The results suggest that a higher corruption perception (lower index) implies higher fraud loss
volatility, but more employees per branch diminish the fraud loss volatility. These results are
6We performed but not reported standard OLS regressions.
7Given that losses smaller than e20,000 are not considered in the data, all loss data is truncated from below
and therefore, truncated distribution functions needed to be estimated.
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Table 7. Estimates of the Regression in the Mean (Truncated Weibull)
Regressors Estimates Std. error t-value p-value
Regression in the mean
Intercept -2.80 0.098 -28.43 0.000 ***
GDP growth 0.01 0.006 2.09 0.037 *
CPI -0.05 0.012 -4.06 0.000 ***
Control -0.40 0.184 -2.17 0.030 *
Employees per branch 0.13 0.003 51.57 0.000 ***
Assets per employee -0.01 0.005 -1.95 0.051 .
Regression in the scale
Intercept 0.733 0.085 8.61 0.000 ***
CPI -0.068 0.011 -6.32 0.000 ***
Employees per branch -0.012 0.002 -5.84 0.000 ***
GDP growth (a) 0.002 0.005 0.45 0.651
Control (a) -0.015 0.153 -0.10 0.924
Assets per employee (a) 0.009 0.005 1.85 0.065 .
Notes: Significance codes: 0 = ∗ ∗ ∗, 0.001 = ∗∗, 0.01 = ∗, 0.05 = .
(a) Smoothing is performed with p-splines
not straightforward to justify in terms of theory but provides an interesting starting point for
further research. For now, this is beyond the scope of this paper.
Table 7 reports the baseline regression. However, models in the GAMLSS setup may differ in
the underlying distribution of the error terms. In the OLS setup the only distribution modelled
is the Normal. In the GAMLSS there are families of distributions from which to choose. Once
a distribution is chosen, models still differ because they may have different covariates.
The approach taken in this paper considers first choosing the distributions given a benchmark
set of covariates. Table 8 shows the Akaike information criteria (AIC) statistics for the estimated
models and specifications for the underlying distributions of the errors. The AIC supports the
truncated Weibull model with mean and scale shown in Tables 7. Table A-2 in the appendix
shows a set of models that are estimated. The key findings about the effect of GDP growth rates
and the CPI are robust across models. When the dummy for the financial crisis is included, the
effect of GDP growth becomes insignificant. However the model with crisis dummy is inferior
in terms of the AIC.
Frequency regressions
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Table 8. Severity Model Selection
Distributions AIC
Truncated Weibull (mean and scale with smoothing in regression) -6,581
Truncated generalized Pareto (mean and scale with smoothing in regression) -6,503
Truncated Weibull (mean and scale regression) -6,362
Truncated generalized Gamma (mean and scale regression) -6,361
Truncated Weibull (only mean regression) -6,299
Truncated generalized Gamma (only mean regression) -6,297
Table 9 shows the result of the benchmark regression. GDP growth affects the number
of annual loss events positively; more controls and more retail assets per employee reduce the
number of losses. In the case of frequency, the CPI is not a significant regressor, neither a
group of regressors such as government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of Law, control of
corruption; all taken from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators.
In addition, the regression in the scale or the variance of the number of losses shown in
Table 9 confirms that more employees per branch increase the variance in the number of annual
losses and more operational risk controls reduce it.
Table 9. Regression Results in the Frequency Model
Regressors Estimates Std. error t-value p-value
Regression in the mean
Intercept 4.33 0.298 14.528 0.000 ***
GDP growth 0.13 0.019 7.020 0.000 ***
Controls -3.50 0.575 -6.096 0.000 ***
Assets per employee -0.03 0.016 -1.969 0.050 .
Regression in the scale
Intercept -0.14 0.507 -0.272 0.786
Employees per branch 0.05 0.015 3.019 0.003 **
Controls (a) -2.18 1.057 -2.064 0.040 *
Note: Smoothing is performed with p splines and significance codes are 0 = ∗ ∗ ∗, 0.001 =
∗∗, 0.01 = ∗, 0.05 = ..
Variants of the Poisson, Negative Binomial Type I, and Negative Binomial Type II (see
Rigby et al. 2017) were estimated with GAMLSS. The chosen model, according to the AIC (see
Table 10) was the Negative Binomial with regressions in the mean and scale.
Table A-3 in the appendix shows the details of the alternative regressions. Across all re-
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gressions, GDP growth stands robustly significant with a parameter value of 0.13. This means
that there is a strong evidence that the opportunistic behavior described in Cressey’s triangle
also affects the number of fraud events. Hence, GDP growth affects both the number of events
and the severity of those events. This is in line with the theory of opportunistic behavior of
fraudsters when good aggregate economic times arrive.
Table 10. Frequency Model Selection
Distributions AIC
Negative binomial (mean and scale with smoothing in regression) 1,612
Negative binomial II (mean and scale with smoothing in regression) 1,624
Negative binomial (mean and scale regression) 1,632
Negative binomial II (mean and scale regression) 1,635
Negative binomial (only mean regression) 1,637
Negative binomial II (only mean regression) 1,659
5 Conclusions
This paper lays out a stochastic dynamic internal fraud model for operational risk to simulate
operational losses due to internal fraud in retail banking. The model aims to capture the nature
of internal fraud and the operational controls to mitigate or avoid the monetary losses caused
by internal fraudsters. The model incorporates human factors such as the level of employees per
branch as well as the ethical quality of workers. It also includes the endogenous risk controls.
The huge number of model parameters are calibrated by means of a shrinkage procedure
that depends on available information about the heterogenous nature of banks in the ORX
dataset. The simulated losses implied by the model mimic the aggregate ORX data in terms of
the number of loss events and their severity in the retail banking, internal fraud cell as published
in ORX (2012).
Losses generated by the model are associated with GDP growth and the corruption percep-
tion of the country where banks are located. The generalized linear regression results are new
because they uncover one important determinant of fraud losses not previously documented in
the literature: The corruption perception index of a country. The results imply that higher
corruption perception indices at the national level have a direct effect on the size of losses due
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to internal fraud events. The findings show that it is the yearly average size of losses that are
affected by national corruption perceptions, not the frequency of losses within a year.
This paper can be extended in a number of ways. With real ORX data, the model parameters
can be estimated with standard statistical procedures. Also, the causal effect from national
corruption indicators to internal fraud in banks can be further explored. Currently, the paper
does not make any distinction of losses originating in many countries within the international
banks that have offices worldwide. The paper only considers the countries that have banks’
headquarters.
The model described in the paper, with its benchmark calibration, can be also used to
statistically compare data aggregation techniques dealing with consortium data. This can be
done by means of monte-carlo simulations.
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Appendix
A Tables
Notes on Table A-1:
The main source of the list of banks in Table A-1 is ORX (2016). The list only shows banks
that were active members of the ORX association in the period 2006-2010. As shown, member
banks are gathered all over the world but belong mainly to advanced economies. Some members
banks do not belong to the association anymore because they filed into bankruptcy especially
as a consequence of The Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 or because they were absorbed by
other banks.
The main source is then complemented by partial listings of ORX membership appearing
on a number of presentations (see Patel 2009; Sabatini and Wills 2008; Sabatini 2009; Kennett
2009)
Given the information in Table A-1, the model calibration implied a varying number of total
banks in the sample. For example, up to end of 2008, there are N=39 banks. In year 2009,
10 banks entered the data exchange association, and four banks quit the association, making
N = 45 banks participating in the data exchange. By the end of 2010, one more banks entered
the association, making N = 48 active banks. We track 52 banks in total and 35 banks that
belongs to ORX the entire five-year period. The key workable assumption is that arrivals and
departures from the association are set at the beginning of each year. In addition, the database
contained only banks that operated a retail-banking segment. Therefore, some banks that
belong to the ORX association but only perform investment banking or other lines of business
were omitted from the database.
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Table A-1. Member Banks of the ORX Data Exchange by Country and Selected Dates
Name of bank country
country bank membership note
code code date
1 Bank of Nova Scotia Canada CAN BNS Apr-02
2 Commerzbank AG Germany DEU CBA Apr-02
3 Deutsche Bank AG Germany DEU DBA Apr-02
4 BNP Paribas France FRA BNP Apr-02
5 ABN AMRO Netherlands NLD ABN Apr-02
6 Fortis NL Netherlands NLD FTL Apr-02 *
7 ING Group Netherlands NLD ING Apr-02
8 JPMorgan Chase & Co. United States USA JPM Apr-02
9 Bank of America United States USA BOA Mar-04
10 West LB Germany DEU WLB Jun-04 *
11 Banesto Spain ESP BNS Jun-05 *
12 SEB (Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken) Sweden SWE SEB Jun-05
13 Credit Agricole SA France FRA CAS Dec-05
14 Banc Sabadell Spain ESP BSB Apr-06
15 Cajamar Spain ESP CMR Apr-06
16 Barclays Bank United Kingdom GBR BLB Apr-06
17 Bank Austria - Creditanstalt Austria AUT BAC Jun-06
18 Fortis Belgium BEL FTS Jun-06 *
19 Caixa Catalunya Spain ESP CCT Jun-06 *
20 Banco Portugues de Negocios Portugal PRT BPN Jun-06 *
21 National City United States USA NAT Jun-06 *
22 Erste Group Bank AG Austria AUT EGB Ago-06
23 BMO Financial Group Canada CAN BMO Oct-06
24 Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) Financial Group Canada CAN RBC Oct-06
25 Banco Popular Spain ESP BPO Dec-06 *
26 Lloyds Banking Group United Kingdom GBR LBG Dec-06
27 US Bancorp United States USA USB Dec-06
28 Grupo Santander Spain ESP BST Jan-07
29 Toronto Dominion Bank Group (TD BG) Canada CAN TDB Mar-07
30 Banco Pastor Spain ESP BPS Jun-07 *
31 Caja Laboral Spain ESP CLB Jun-07 *
32 HBOS PLC United Kingdom GBR HBO Jun-07 *
33 Wachovia Corporation United States USA WCR Jun-07
34 Washington Mutual United States USA WAM Jun-07
35 PNC Bank United States USA PNC Nov-07
36 Royal Bank of Scotland Group United Kingdom GBR RBS Dec-07
37 Bank of Ireland Group Ireland IRL BIG Dec-07
38 HSBC Holdings plc United Kingdom GBR HSB Jan-08
39 Hana Bank South Korea KOR HBK Jan-08 *
40 Rabobank Nederland Netherlands NLD RBN Jan-08
41 National Australia Bank Australia AUS NAB Sep-08
42 Banco Bradesco S/A Brazil BRA BSC Sep-08
43 Caixanova Spain ESP CNV Sep-08 *
44 Wells Fargo & Co United States USA WFC Sep-08
45 First Rand South Africa ZAF FRD Sep-08
46 Deutsche Postbank AG Germany DEU DPB Nov-08
47 Standard Chartered Bank Singapore SGP STA Dec-08
48 Capital One United States USA CON Mar-09
49 Bank of New York Mellon United States USA BNY Jul-09
50 Westpac Banking Corporation Australia AUS WBC Nov-09
51 Commonwealth Bank of Australia Australia AUS CBA Dec-09
52 Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale France FRA SGL Dec-09
Note: * marks banks that are not members of the ORX association any more.
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Table A-2. Severity regressions with GAMLSS
Mean regression Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept -2.80 -2.78 -2.43 -2.65 -2.47 -2.59
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
GDP growth 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(*) (*) (*) (*) (*)
Crisis -0.08
(**)
CPI -0.05 -0.05 -0.17 -0.12 -0.16 -0.10
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (.)
Government Effectiveness 0.33
(***)
Regulatory Quality 0.21
(*)
Rule of Law 0.29
(***)
Control of Corruption 0.10
Control -0.40 -0.63 -0.26 -0.44 -0.42 -0.42
(*) (***) (*) (*) (*)
Employees per branch 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Assets per employee -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
(.) (*) (*) (***)
Scale regression
Intercept 0.73 0.56 1.12 0.83 1.12 0.92
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
GDP growth 0.01 -0.02
(*)
CPI -0.07 -0.02 -0.20 -0.15 -0.21 -0.11
(***) (.) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Employees per branch -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Diagnostics
Global Deviance -6657.35 -6633.58 -6677.04 -6718.08 -6732.36 -6658.17
AIC -6581.01 -6553.02 -6598.11 -6610.79 -6624.83 -6577.47
SBC -6344.62 -6303.55 -6353.68 -6278.53 -6291.84 -6327.55
All models include additional regressors that are defined in terms of smoothed terms. They are not reported
here because they are used as additional controls. Smoothing is performed with p-splines.
Significance codes are 0 =′ ∗ ∗ ∗′, 0.001 =′ ∗∗′, 0.01 =′ ∗′, 0.05 =′ .′, 0.1 =′′.
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Table A-3. Frequency regressions with GAMLSS
Mean regression Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Intercept 4.33 4.32 4.28 4.23 4.22 4.24 4.40
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
GDP growth 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.12
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Dummy for crisis 0.04
CPI 0.02
Gov. effectiveness 0.12
Regulatory Quality 0.13
Rule of Law 0.17
Control of Corruption 0.00
Control -3.50 -3.51 -3.68 -3.70 -3.69 -3.83 -3.69
(***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***) (***)
Assets per employee -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04
(.) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*) (*)
Scale regression
Intercept -0.14 -0.14 -0.11 -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 -0.47
Employees per branch 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
(**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**)
Diagnostics
Global Deviance 1581.63 1581.58 1570.44 1581.11 1570.75 1562.64 1535.25
AIC 1611.76 1613.72 1606.82 1612.27 1609.40 1604.36 1584.57
SBC 1663.01 1668.40 1668.74 1665.30 1675.15 1675.34 1668.48
1) All models include additional regressors that are defined in terms of smoothed terms. They are not reported here
because they are used as additional controls. Smoothing is performed with p-splines.
2) Significance codes are 0 =′ ∗ ∗ ∗′, 0.001 =′ ∗∗′, 0.01 =′ ∗′, 0.05 =′ .′, 0.1 =′′.
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Figure B-1. Distribution of parameters of the ramp function that defines the outbreak of
operational losses in each bank.
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Figure B-2. Distribution of other idiosyncratic parameters in the operational loss model.
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